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Abstract What is the function of modal judgment? Why do we (need to be able
to) make judgments of possibility and necessity? Or are such judgments, in fact,
dispensable? This paper introduces and develops an answer to these questions based
on Kant’s remarks in section 76 of the Critique of Judgment. Here, Kant appears to
argue the following: that a capacity to make modal judgments using (categorial) modal
concepts is required for a capacity for objective representation, in light of our split
cognitive architecture. This split cognitive architecture leaves room for a mismatch
between our concepts and intuitions and, Kant argues, that is why we need modal
concepts and modal judgments. In this paper, I develop this account of the function of
modal judgment and to explore the extent to which it may improve upon contemporary
alternatives. I focus on one particularly important challenge for the account: to explain
why a distinction between the actual and the possible, rather than merely a distinction
between the actual and the non-actual, is required. In order to answer this question, I
supplement the account with a particular way of thinking about objectivity.
Keywords Actuality · Metaphysical modality · Modal judgment · Objectivity ·
Possibility · Kant
1 Introduction
What is the function of modal judgment? Why do we (need to be able to) make
judgments of possibility and necessity? Or are such judgments, in fact, dispensable?
My aim in this paper is to introduce and develop a new answer to these questions. Or
B Jessica Leech
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rather, the answer is old—it comes from Kant—but its application to this debate is
new.
The proposal is based on Kant’s remarks in section 76 of the Critique of Judgment.
Here, Kant appears to argue the following: that a capacity to make modal judgments
using (categorial) modal concepts is required for our capacity for objective repre-
sentation, in light of our split cognitive architecture.1 Creatures with minds like ours
require both intuitions (direct, singular representations) and concepts (mediate, gen-
eral representations), both the contributions of sensibility (the capacity to be presented
with objects in experience) and of thought to have objective representations about the
world. This split cognitive architecture leaves room for a mismatch between our con-
cepts and intuitions which could undermine the possibility of objective representation
and, Kant argues, that is why we need modal concepts and modal judgments.
My aim in this paper is not to defend this reading of Kant, but to develop this account
of the function of modal judgment and explore the extent to which such an account may
improve upon the contemporary alternatives. More generally, I aim to give an example
of how Kant’s philosophy can still make a positive contribution to our philosophical
understanding today, namely, how certain aspects of his understanding of objectivity,
if defensible, could help us to understand the function of modal judgment.
I shall proceed as follows. First, I separate some different questions that we might
be asking, and suggest that one question is particularly interesting: what I call a tran-
scendental question for metaphysical modality. Next, I give a brief overview of extant
options. I won’t discuss these in extensive detail, or argue that they fail, but I will
suggest where a Kantian account might have the potential to improve upon them, or
at least provide an interesting alternative. With these preliminaries in place, I turn
to the “Kantian gap”. In brief: the account has the potential to answer the transcen-
dental question because the function of judgments about possibility and actuality is
to make possible objective thought. The account also has the potential to answer the
metaphysical modality question, insofar as it concerns a kind of modality that is not
merely logical, and which concerns the most general conditions under which we can
have objective representations. In my discussion, I focus on one particularly impor-
tant challenge for the account: to explain why a distinction between the actual and the
possible, rather than merely a distinction between the actual and the non-actual, is
required. In order to answer this question, I will need to supplement the account with
a particular way of thinking about objectivity.
2 Questions about modal judgment
When we ask about the function of modal judgment, we need to distinguish differ-
ent kinds of question that we might be asking.2 I am assuming here that “we” are
humans, or creatures with human-like cognitive capacities. We are able to have objec-
tive thoughts about the world, and perceptions, and engage with the world in all sorts
of ways, such as performing actions, and gaining knowledge of the world. What is
1 This interpretation is defended and explained at length in Leech (2014).
2 Thank you to John Divers for helpful discussion of these different questions.
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most crucial, is that creatures with such cognitive capacities can be mistaken about
how the world is, unlike, for example, a divine mind with perfect knowledge. For Kant,
that potential for mistake stems–broadly—from the fact that our capacity for thinking
on the one hand, and the way in which we get into touch with the world on the other,
can come apart.
First, though, let us pause to consider why we might want to ask questions about the
function of modal judgment at all. It may be an interesting issue in its own right, but
there is also the potential for deeper significance. One approach to the metaphysics
of modality suggests that we should take time to examine the role of our modal
judgments, in particular, whether judgments about alethic modality play any legitimate
and indispensable role, as an important underpinning to the project of giving an account
of modality. For if such judgments were eliminable in favour of, for example, epistemic
judgments, we would have no real need for them, and so also we would have no need
for an account of modality. Hence, Divers suggests that,
A theory of modality ought to be no more substantial than is required in order to
account for the body of modal assertions that we have to make in order to achieve
whatever it is that our modalizing achieves for us. (Divers 2010, pp. 190–191)
The worry is that without an account of the function of modal judgment we may
overshoot the requirements of our modal theorizing, at best wasting time, at worst
developing a theory that misrepresents modality.3
One might think that there is a simple answer: the function of modal judgment
is to report modal facts. So we can, pretty quickly, assume that there is a realm of
modal facts out there to be investigated. However, this is to ignore part of what is so
interesting about modality in the first place. One of the peculiarities of modal discourse
and judgments is that we cannot take it for granted that they are fact-reporting. Suppose
we claim that it is possible that p, even though it is not the case that p. What kind of fact
might that report, given that is it not the case that p? Similarly, suppose we claim that
it is necessary that q, over and above its being the case that q. Again, what kind of fact
might that report beyond the fact that q?4 My point here is not that there are no answers
to these questions, but that they seem to be substantive questions to which the answers
are not obvious. Hence, it seems reasonable to consider more carefully what role
such modal claims are needed to play, before assuming that they are straightforwardly
factual.5
Moving on, the first kind of question we might ask concerns the kind of role that
modal judgment might have for us.
The Practical Question What is the practical use of modal judgments? How
would we be worse off if we didn’t make them?
3 See also Blackburn (1993).
4 My use of ‘fact’ here is not intended to connote a certain, specific metaphysics of facts, but just the idea
that modal judgments may correspond to how things are in the world in a realist way.
5 See also Nolan (2010) for misgivings with this approach.
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The Transcendental Question Does modal judgment play a transcendental
role—is an ability to make modal judgments a necessary condition of the very
possibility of some crucial feature of our cognitive lives?
Some putative functions of modal judgment might make things easier for us in
various ways, and so answer the practical question. But other putative functions might
be more closely connected to more significant features of our lives. In particular, we
might be interested in whether modal judgment plays any role in our capacity to be
thinkers.
Second, there are questions relating to whether we can reduce or even eliminate the
modal judgments we need to make.
The Reduction Question Can we reduce the number of legitimate, ineliminable
cases of modal judgments?
The Elimination Question Could all modal judgments be refrained from, or
replaced with another kind of judgment?
For example, one might think that there is no legitimate, ineliminable function for
possibility judgments, but that there is such a function for necessity judgments. Hence,
we only need to bear commitments to necessities rather than possibilities. This, in turn,
may have interesting consequences for the kinds of commitments we need to incur in
our modal metaphysics. For example, suppose one analyses judgments of necessity in
terms of universal quantification over worlds, and judgments of possibility in terms of
existential quantification over worlds. As universal quantification is not existentially
committing, a commitment only to necessity judgments, even analysed in this way,
should incur no existential commitment to worlds.6 By contrast, one might ask whether
the class of modal judgments as a whole could be dispensed with or whether, if they do
have a legitimate function, this could be fulfilled by a different kind of judgment. For
example, one might take possibility judgments to simply be judgments that something
is not known, and necessity judgments to concern what is known or certain.
Finally, there is the kind of modality we are interested in. There are many different
kinds of modality. And so we can ask any of these questions for modality in general,
or for any specific kind of modality. For example,
The General Question Is there any important function, in any of the above senses,
for any judgments of any kind of modality?
The Metaphysical Modality Question Is there any important function, in any of
the above senses, for judgments of metaphysical modality?
In this paper, I focus on whether we can find an answer to the transcendental
elimination question about metaphysical modality, i.e., what is the transcendental role
of metaphysical modal judgment? Would there still be the same kind of thinker, if they
refrained from all metaphysical modal judgments?
6 This is a very brief and incomplete sketch of the beginnings of Divers’s account of agnosticism about
possible worlds. See Divers (2004, 2010).
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One might immediately object: surely most thinkers never make any judgments
of metaphysical modality, for metaphysical modality is a philosopher’s invention,
with little obvious everyday application or use. In which case, the question about the
consequences of abstinence from such judgments is close to absurd.
To be clear: there are (at least) two worrisome features of metaphysical modality.
First, it is not always terribly clear what, if anything, metaphysical modality is supposed
to be, and how we should characterise it. Of course, substantive accounts exist, such
as the view that modality has its source in the essences of things.7 But this is not
helpful as a characterisation of the notion that realists and anti-realists might share
and be interested in alike: it already assumes a variety of realism, namely, that modal
discourse concerns facts about, or grounded in, essence. It would be interesting if
we could find an account of a function for a range of modal judgments that were
recognisably “metaphysical”, without bearing an antecedent commitment to a realist
modal metaphysics. Second, as already noted, one might, quite reasonably, worry that
metaphysical modality is an invention of philosophers that doesn’t correspond to any
real phenomenon that is worthy of proper study. As Williamson remarks,
Does metaphysical modality really matter outside philosophy? Even if physicists
care about the physical necessity of the laws they conjecture, does it matter to
physics whether physically necessary laws are also metaphysically necessary?
In ordinary life, we care whether someone could have done otherwise, whether
disaster could have been averted, but the kind of possibility at issue there is far
more narrowly circumscribed than metaphysical possibility, by not prescinding
from metaphysically contingent initial conditions. He could not have done other-
wise because he was in chains, even though it was metaphysically contingent that
he was in chains. Does “could have been” ever express metaphysical possibility
when used non-philosophically? (2007, p. 135)
If, however, we could find a crucial role for judgments of a kind of modality plausibly
classified as metaphysical, this would cement metaphysical modality as an important
object of study, not just for the benefit of practising philosophers, but, potentially, for
all thinkers. In sum, then, my response to these worries about metaphysical modality
is postponed until the end of this paper: if there is an answer to the transcendental
question for something that looks for all the world like metaphysical modality, we will
have a reason to take it to be more than a philosopher’s conceit.
As for my focus on the transcendental question: It strikes me that this is the question
at stake if one is interested in the function of modal judgment as potentially under-
pinning wider theorizing about the metaphysics of modality. For a merely practical
use may seem to be too weak. Even if modal judgment had some practical function
that committed one to a full dress modal metaphysics, one might worry that such a
function may be too contingent a basis for this. In other words, one might worry that
a practical function is unlikely to be properly ineliminable, even if legitimate. Even
if, say, we cannot do without modal judgments for some practical purpose, the ques-
tion will always remain whether we can do without fulfilling that practical purpose.
7 See, for example, Fine (1994) and Hale (2013).
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By contrast, a positive answer to the transcendental question would make a much
stronger case for the ineliminability of modal judgment. If being able to make modal
judgments is an ineliminable part of our ability even to think about the world, it is
harder to dismiss this by claiming that objective thought itself is something we could
do without.
One further clarification is in order. There are two broad ways one might give
a positive answer to the transcendental question: (1) modal judgment itself directly
plays some important role in our cognitive lives; (2) there is some important aspect
of our cognitive lives of which the capacity to make modal judgments is a side-
effect, and modal judgment does not, in and of itself, have any further transcendental
function. An answer of the first kind would be a straightforwardly positive answer to
the transcendental question. In the second case, whilst it would be a valuable result to
discover such a source for a capacity for modal judgment, it would be a considerably
weaker answer to the same question. Yes, one might say, it is strictly speaking true
that modal judgments are a necessary condition of the very possibility of some crucial
feature of our cognitive lives, but only because the capacity to make them follows from
something else which plays a more explanatory role. In what follows, I attempt to find
an answer of the first kind. I want to consider whether modal judgment, if necessary
for thinkers like us, is more than a side-effect of more important cognitive capacities.
3 Suppositions and counterfactual thinking
There are at least two existing options: accounts of modal judgment based on the impor-
tance of a capacity for suppositional reasoning (in, e.g., McFetridge 1990; Divers and
Elstein 2012; Divers and González-Varela 2013), and accounts drawing on the impor-
tance of a capacity for counterfactual thinking (in, e.g., Williamson 2007; Kroedel
2017).
The former approach originates—at least in its present form in the literature—with
McFetridge’s argument that our practice of reasoning from suppositions commits us to
a belief in logically necessarily truth-preserving rules of inference and, a fortiori, to a
belief in logical necessity. The key point of McFetridge’s argument is that this practice
of reasoning from suppositions commits us to there being some rule of inference that
would be valid when reasoning from any supposition whatsoever. In a nutshell: no
matter what, this rule holds. Such an approach is not on its own sufficient to answer
the metaphysical modality question (and of course, it was not intended to do so). It
is presented as an argument to explain the function of beliefs in logical necessity. In
more recent work, Divers and others have therefore attempted to develop the proposal
to account for belief in absolute necessity, where absolute necessity may turn out to
encompass metaphysical necessity.
We contend that some propositions hold with absolute but non-logical necessity,
and, as is well known, broadly logical necessity, analytic necessity, mathemat-
ical necessity and metaphysical necessity are frequently understood that way.
Our central question, then, is whether the McFetridge account of belief in abso-
lute necessity can straightforwardly and successfully encompass the non-logical
case(s). (Divers and Elstein 2012, pp. 110–111)
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The strategy begins by distinguishing between two different kinds of supposition on
the basis of which one might be reasoning: supposing-as-actual (A-supposition) and
supposing-as-counterfactual (C-supposition). A-supposition is associated with expres-
sion in the indicative mood as in, for example, ‘If Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy, then
who did?’ Similarly, C-supposition is associated with expression in the subjunctive
mood as in, for example, ‘If Oswald hadn’t shot Kennedy, would someone else have?’
In broad terms, a belief in absolute necessity is tied to the practice of C-supposition.
Where before a belief in logical necessity was manifested by preparedness to deploy
a rule of inference when reasoning from any supposition whatsoever, Divers and
González-Varela offer a more complex condition for the manifestation of a belief in
absolute necessity.
(MAN) (i) X believes that P and (ii) for all S, such that X finds herself [(ii) able
to A-suppose P and (iii) subsequently to C-suppose that S] X is prepared to add
P as a premise in reasoning from the C-supposition that S. (2013, p. 381)
The final clause expresses the idea, similar to that above, that such a belief would be
manifested by preparedness to deploy P in reasoning from any supposition whatsoever.
Again, in crude terms, P can be taken to be true no matter what might be the case. The
earlier part of the condition adds some constraints on P.
Without examining this proposal in detail, we can already recognise one important
feature for present purposes, namely, that the proposal—as an answer to the practical
or the transcendental question—stands or falls with the importance of C-supposition
in general. As Divers and González-Varela themselves note,
Presuming that C-supposition is itself an important (useful, indispensible) activ-
ity, one can see how that activity is assisted by our having at our disposal a stock
of propositions which—without further ado, independently of (knowledge of)
context and without scrutinizing the content of the particular C-supposition in
question—we can rely upon (by introducing as premises) in expanding any
C-supposition through good inference. Yet, this answer to the question of the
function of judgments of absolute necessity is partial in virtue of its presump-
tion, and shifts the question of function to the phenomenon of C-supposition
itself. (2013, p. 387, emphasis added)
The question then becomes one of the indispensability or otherwise of C-supposition.
There is other work directly addressing the importance of counterfactual thinking.
Such work may supplement the Divers project insofar as it proposes explanations of
the function of counterfactual thinking. It may also provide its own explanation of the
role of modal judgment. The claim is that there is an important role for counterfactual
thinking to play in our lives, and that counterfactual thinking is, or involves, or supports,
making judgments with modal content.
Williamson presents a version of the counterfactual view that has the potential to
answer the transcendental metaphysical modality question. He argues that ‘counterfac-
tual thought is deeply integrated into our empirical thought in general’ (2007, p. 141);
that a cognitive capacity for thinking about metaphysical modality is a by-product of
our capacity for thinking about counterfactuals; and hence that a capacity for thinking
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about metaphysical modality is a by-product of a deep-seated feature of our capacity
for empirical thought in general.
The epistemology of metaphysical modality requires no dedicated faculty of intu-
ition. It is simply a special case of the epistemology of counterfactual thinking,
a kind of thinking tightly integrated with our thinking about the spatio-temporal
world. To deny that such thinking ever yields knowledge is to fall into an extrav-
agant skepticism. Here as elsewhere, we can do philosophy on the basis of
general cognitive capacities that are in no deep way peculiarly philosophical.
(Williamson 2007, p. 178)
The link to metaphysical modality is clear. It is not that we need to make judgments of
metaphysical necessity and possibility, but that in being able to make the judgments
we do need to be able to make, the capacity for metaphysical modal thinking comes
along for free. In short: metaphysical necessity and possibility can be understood in
terms of the limiting case of counterfactual thought.
(21) A≡∀p (p → A)
According to (21), something is necessary if and only if whatever were the case,
it would still be the case … That is a natural way of explaining informally what
metaphysical necessity is. (Williamson 2007, p. 159)
I want briefly to raise two concerns for the use of Williamson’s view as an answer to
the transcendental question. First, whether we can take this to provide an answer to
the practical or to the transcendental question, if either, (and also therefore to what
extent we can supplement the suppositional approach) depends upon the function of
counterfactual thinking. I take Williamson to present four roles for counterfactual
thinking: taking something as evidence for something else; learning from the past;
planning for the future; and causal thinking (2007, pp. 137–141). One might reasonably
take the first three roles to have most potential in the context of an answer to the
practical question. Certain kinds of learning and planning are no doubt very useful,
but not obviously essential to the very ability to think about the world at all. Perhaps
if we lost all three of these abilities, our thinking would be extremely impoverished,
but it isn’t clear that it would be altogether gone.
From a Kantian perspective, there is something more interesting in the fourth case.
For Kant argued that causal thinking is a condition on a capacity for genuine objective
thought. How modality gets into the picture may be different—Williamson takes there
to be a close link between causal and counterfactual thinking (2007, p. 141), whereas
Kant takes the concept of causation to be one of necessary connection8—but in both
cases causal thinking is of crucial importance, and is further linked to modal thinking.
It is likely that a connection to causal thinking provides one important function for
modal thinking.9 But that does not stop us from investigating whether there are further,
perhaps more direct, functions for modal thinking.
8 Kant 1998, 312
9 See Kannisto (2017).
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This leads to my second concern with the counterfactual thinking approach, namely,
that it only gives the weaker answer to the transcendental question, i.e., the capacity
for judgments of metaphysical necessity and possibility follows from an important,
ineliminable role for some other kind of thinking, and does not have such a role itself.
As noted above, my interest here is in whether we can give the stronger answer.
4 The Kantian gap
Let us turn to section 76 of the Critique of Judgment. Kant’s argument begins with his
distinction between concepts and intuitions. According to Kant, concepts are general
representations which, by their nature, can pick out more than one thing (even though
they can be used to pick out a single thing sometimes). Concepts also relate mediately
to the objects that fall under them, that is, they apply to objects in virtue of features that
objects have in common. For example, the concept frog applies to many things, and
it applies to them by virtue of features that they have in common. According to Kant,
the representations he calls ‘intuitions’ are singular representations which, by their
nature, can only relate to one thing.10 Intuitions also relate directly to their objects.
One might think of an intuition as a direct presentational relation between a particular
and a perceiver.11
For Kant, perceivers and thinkers like us need both concepts and intuitions—
intuitions to provide a direct link with objects; concepts to conceptualise our presenta-
tions of objects as something or other. It is only if both of these capacities co-operate
that we can have the kind of experience of the world that is familiar to us. Without
concepts, we might be presented with perceptual particulars, but we wouldn’t be able
to understand or reflect on that experience. For example, I could be perceptually aware,
via intuition, of a particular thing, but not be aware that it was a frog. In turn, intuition
contributes to the meaning of concepts. One can think of the ‘empirical meaning’ of
a concept as something like: what kinds of things the concept would apply to in the
world which is it possible for us to experience. It is only possible for us to experience
the world via the contribution of intuition (we need to be presented with objects).
Hence, it must be possible for a concept to apply to things given to us in intuition—its
purported object(s) must be ‘intuitable’—for it to have empirical meaning. This is not
to say that concepts that lack empirical meaning are entirely senseless—for example,
Kant discusses the ‘merely logical significance’ that pure concepts have independent
of their applicability to objects of possible experience.12 I discuss the meaning of
concepts and judgments that lack this kind of applicability to objects of experience
in more detail elsewhere, but the important point for present purposes is the relation
between concepts and intuitions.13
10
‘Singular’ doesn’t have to mean ‘simple’. For example, one might have an intuition that has parts
corresponding to the parts of its object. Thank you to an anonymous referee for raising this point.
11 See Allais (2015).
12 Kant 1998, 276–277
13 Roughly and briefly, the meaning of concepts and judgments that themselves are not intuitable can be
derived from (at least) two sources; composition out of concepts and judgments that do have empirical
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So, our capacities for intuition and conceptual thought must cooperate. Neverthe-
less, they are distinct capacities. Hence, they can come apart—we can sometimes have
intuitions without concepts, and concepts without intuitions (and so have thoughts that
aren’t confirmed by direct experience of things being that way). Kant argues that this
potential mismatch of two separate capacities means that thinkers like us require the
ability to make a distinction between possibility and actuality (and by association,
contingency and necessity), because we need to be able to cope with the fact that
some of our thoughts do not actually have corresponding intuitions, although they
could. We need to possess these modal concepts, in order to make this distinction in
thought.
It is absolutely necessary for the human understanding to distinguish between the
possibility and the actuality of things. The reason for this lies in the subject and
the nature of its cognitive faculties. For if two entirely heterogeneous elements
were not required for the exercise of these faculties, understanding for concepts
and sensible intuition for objects corresponding to them, then there would be no
such distinction (between the possible and the actual). … Thus the distinction of
possible from actual things is one that is merely subjectively valid for the human
understanding, since we can always have something in our thoughts although it
does not exist … (Kant 2000: 272; 5:401–402)
Note, Kant’s concern is more with the one direction—thoughts without intuition—than
the other—intuition without concepts—although both are forms of potential mismatch.
I take it that this is because the problem for objective representation, developed below,
only arises in the former case. Thoughts purport to make some kind of claim about the
world that might turn out to be wrong, given the potential lack of intuitive confirma-
tion, whereas intuitions without concepts would amount to a kind of ‘uninterpreted’
experience. This latter does not so much threaten to lead us into error, as present us
with something we might want to learn to conceptualise.14
Why do we need to be able to make a distinction between the actual and the
non-actual? Given the potential mismatch between intuitions and conceptual thought,
suppose we had no means to think about this mismatch. That is, suppose we had no
means to think about the difference between those of our thoughts that correspond
to or are confirmed by the world and those that don’t or aren’t. We wouldn’t be able
to separate thought from reality. This would then threaten our status as objective
thinkers. For there would be no way for us to make sense of or acknowledge the
difference between how things seem and how things really are.
Footnote 13 continued
meaning, or derivation from logical forms. Lack of intuitiability largely comes down to a violation of the
conditions of possible experience for which Kant argues. (Leech, ms.).
14 One might also wonder why the representations that potentially lack corresponding intuition have to be
conceptual thoughts. Would the same kind of argument run for, for example, a merely imaginative episode?
What is important here, is that even an imaginative episode involves the use of concepts—it seems to me
very difficult to make sense of completely non-conceptual imagining as something one might engage in.
And so, an imaginative episode that lacked a corresponding intuition would be subject to the same general
problem: a representation using concepts that lacks suitable intuition. Thank you to an anonymous referee
for pressing this issue.
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Characterisations of what it takes for a state (say, a thought or judgment) to be
objective often require that the state has correctness conditions that are independent of
how things are with the subject having the state. Objective states are not subjective. For
example, Christopher Peacocke introduces an intuitive notion of minimal objectivity
as follows.
A thinker’s being in the state, or enjoying the event, does not in general make
the content of the state or event correct. (Peacocke, 2009, p. 739)
Anil Gomes defines what he calls a perspectival notion of objectivity in a similar way,
but this time the independence is not from the thinker’s being in the state, but from
the thinker’s point of view.
Whether or not something is objective turns on the extent to which it is tied to
our point of view; things are objective to the extent that they are independent of
a subject’s point of view and subjective otherwise. (Gomes, 2016, p. 947)
The thought is then this. Given distinct capacities for thought and intuition, just the
thinking of a thought (a thinker’s being in that state, say) is not sufficient for the
thought to be correct.15 That requires that something corresponding to the thought
be presented in intuition. Without a distinction between the case where the thought
does match up with intuition, and the case where it doesn’t, then, we would have no
conception of objectivity. We would have no conception that our thoughts might not
be correct.
The crucial claim is then: without this conception of objectivity, our ability to have
objective thoughts at all would be undermined. One might immediately baulk at this
claim. Surely, one might respond, a creature who lacked any conception that some of
their representations might be wrong, might still have some states that in some sense
match up with the world, and some that don’t. Hence, they would have a capacity for
objective thought, and merely lack a capacity to recognise their objective thoughts as
such. On the contrary: there are good reasons to think that an important role is indeed
played by a conception of objectivity.
An important part of objectivity, as it has been understood here, is that objective
states might turn out to be wrong, because their correctness conditions concern some-
thing beyond the state itself. A question one might naturally ask, then, is how does a
state come to have such correctness conditions?
To start, let us consider the case of a barometer. A (working) barometer represents
atmospheric pressure; it is correct or incorrect, accurate or inaccurate, depending on
whether and how well its states correspond in a predictable way to atmospheric pres-
sure. The correctness conditions, that is, depend on something beyond the state of the
barometer itself. However, there is nothing, in and of itself, that makes the barometer
represent pressure in this way. Yes, the medium inside the barometer (mercury, say)
expands and contracts in proportion to the local atmospheric pressure. But this doesn’t,
on its own, represent anything—even when expanding and contracting in a tube next
to a scale. Of course, the obvious thing to say here is: the barometer represents atmo-
15 There may be trickier cases, for example, the thought that I am thinking something now. This is, I
presume, why Peacocke says ‘in general’.
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spheric pressure because we take it to. At some point we noticed the relation between
volume of medium and atmospheric pressure and exploited it to make devices that
represent atmospheric pressure. I think we need to tell a similar story about how our
own concepts and thoughts come to have correctness conditions that depend on some-
thing beyond the existence of those states themselves. It is because we, in some sense,
take them to have these kinds of correctness conditions.
Partly, this is because alternative explanations seem to be inadequate. I take it that
a mere causal explanation—that objective states have these correctness conditions
due to how the states were caused—is insufficient; there are lots of different poten-
tial causes of a representation, not all (if any) of which are the purported object of
that representation. Causal chains can be, notoriously, deviant, and so one cannot rely
on them to bridge these kinds of gaps. Similarly, one might think that the barometer
represents atmospheric pressure because changes in atmospheric pressure cause the
different states of the barometer. Well, that latter may be true, but that is still not
sufficient for objective representation: we need to take these changes to be representa-
tive of pressure. (Compare: after landing in an aeroplane, one might notice that one’s
water bottle has become squashed, and one might recognise that this was caused by a
change in pressure, without taking the shape of the water bottle to represent a change
in pressure.)
Here is another route to the same point. It is plausible to think that grasping a
thought involves either grasping or knowing or otherwise having some awareness of its
truth conditions or satisfaction conditions.16 In the case of an objective thought, those
satisfaction conditions will concern something beyond the thought itself, as sketched
above. On its own, this doesn’t entail that we also grasp that these are objective
satisfaction conditions. For example, I might grasp what things would have to be
like if snow is white, without grasping that things being like that are the satisfaction
conditions for the thought that snow is white. However, more generally, a grasp of
satisfaction conditions without some kind of conception of satisfaction conditions
is too demanding: surprisingly, more demanding than a conception of satisfaction
conditions. For, there are cases where grasp of a thought is possible without grasp of
its satisfaction conditions, which we may want to accommodate without rejecting our
plausible approach wholesale. If one accepts any externalist content at all, then direct
grasp of the satisfaction conditions for thoughts including externalist content is far too
demanding. For example, one would not be able to have thoughts about gold without
grasping satisfaction conditions in terms of atomic number 79. But surely most thinkers
can do precisely this. How, then, can we hold onto the plausible idea that understanding
involves some grasp of satisfaction conditions, whilst accommodating these difficult
cases? Rather than, say, demanding that a thinker grasp that the thought that this nugget
of gold is shiny is true just when this nugget of element with atomic number 79 is shiny,
a weaker demand would be that a thinker grasp the more general idea that this thought
is true or false depending on how things are with things beyond the (thinking of the)
thought. Thinkers don’t need comprehensive knowledge of external content, but only
something more like: whatever thought I’m having, whether it is correct or not does
16 Thank you to Bill Brewer for helpful discussion of this.
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not depend just on my having it, but on something beyond that. As a consequence, just
having the thought is not sufficient to make the thought correct; hence, one accesses
a distinction between thoughts that are, and are not, correct, given conditions beyond
the having of the thought.
It is clear that this sketch needs more flesh on the bones, to spell out more pre-
cisely the way we need to grasp correctness conditions, and how that cashes out in
different kinds of cases. But I hope the foregoing comments are at least sufficient to
lend support to the present point: objective representations have a certain kind of cor-
rectness condition, and the best way to explain that they have this kind of correctness
condition, is that thinkers who have those representations themselves grasp that they
have correctness conditions that depend on something other than the (thinking of the)
representation itself.17
These remarks may be reminiscent of Hannah Ginsborg’s work on the normativ-
ity of meaning (of concepts and of language). Ginsborg contrasts a view according
to which meaningful things have correctness conditions, but thinkers do not need
to have a grasp of the idea of correctness conditions, with her own view where some
additional awareness of correctness conditions is required (Ginsborg 2012). She devel-
ops Wittgenstein’s story of the builders: when the builder shouts ‘Slab!’ the assistant
responds by passing over a slab, and when the assistant looks under the tarp and sees
a slab, he utters ‘Slab’. Ginsborg argues that a dispositional story does not adequately
account for the meaningfulness of these utterances.
[T]he dispositionalist account fails to accommodate the idea that meaning, in the
relevant sense, requires understanding. The reason why the automaton and the
hypnotized agent, fail to mean anything by ‘slab’ is that they fail to understand
‘slab’. They respond to it, so to speak, blindly, or, as Kripke puts it, in a ‘jack-
in-the-box’ way (1982, p. 23). But in order for users of an expression to mean
something by an expression, or for the expression itself to mean something in
the semantic sense rather than the sense of indicating, the expression must be
understood by its users. (Ginsborg 2012, p. 134)
According to Ginsborg, in addition to having the right responses, the assistant must
be taking his responses to be appropriate to the situation, that is, he must be taking
some explicitly normative attitude.
My sketch of a view diverges from Ginsborg in important ways. But we share
the core idea that thinking or saying something with meaning and understanding
requires more than the thought or expression having correctness conditions; the thinker
or speaker must also have a certain kind of awareness or grasp of those conditions
as correctness conditions. Ginsborg cashes things out in terms of a certain kind of
normative attitude: taking one’s utterance to be fitting or appropriate. My proposal is
17 Another option, not explored here, but accepting the main premises, would be that others take the
representation to have the appropriate correctness conditions, i.e., some appeal to a community explanation.
But still, that would require at least some members of the community to have a conception of objectivity.
And it would seem a sorry and unequal state of things if only a privileged few had that conception, and
thereby conferred objectivity on the representations of the masses. So even on this alternative, it would
make better sense if the majority of, if not all, thinkers have a conception of objectivity.
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slightly different, but in a similar spirit: taking one’s thought to depend on how things
are beyond (the having of) that thought for its correctness.
One final clarification: this sketch of an argument concerns concept-involving rep-
resentations, primarily, thoughts and judgments. Nothing I have said, at least on the
face of it, requires one to make any claim either way concerning whether we could
have any states relating to objects at all without a conception of objectivity.18 Perhaps
there is still some basic perceptual relation to objects that intuition provides us with,
for example. But it seems plausible that something more sophisticated—objective
thoughts—would have more demanding conditions.19
Let us now grant that some conception of correctness conditions for a thought that
do not depend upon the (thinking of the) thought is required for one to have objective
thoughts. What is the link to the actual/non-actual distinction? One might think that
it is enough to have the concept of a thought’s satisfying these conditions (something
like a concept of the actual) without also requiring the concept of a thought’s failing
to satisfy these conditions (something like a concept of the non-actual).20 For then
we would still grasp the fact that the thought depends upon something other than (the
thinking of it) itself. However, it seems to me that once one has the idea that a state
is correct only when certain conditions independent of the state obtain, that just does
include the idea that, should those conditions not obtain, then the state will not be
correct. Without this other—negative—side, we would just have the idea that these
states relate to the world in an important way. But that wouldn’t give us the resources
to cope with the fact that some of these states do not match up with how the world
is; that was the starting point of Kant’s argument, after all. Something like this line
of thought can be found in Davidson’s argument for the related thesis that in order to
be able to have beliefs one must have a concept of belief, that proceeds via the idea
that one must be capable of surprise, where surprise involves a belief that one’s prior
belief was false.
Surprise requires that I be aware of a contrast between what I did believe and
what I come to believe. Such awareness, however, is a belief about a belief: if I
am surprised, then among other things I come to belief my original belief was
false. I do not need to insist that every case of surprise involves a belief that a
prior belief was false (though I am inclined to think so). What I do want to claim
is that one cannot have a general stock of beliefs of the sort necessary for having
any beliefs at all without being subject to surprises that involve beliefs about the
correctness of one’s own beliefs. (Davidson 1982, p. 326)
18 I don’t intend to take on Tyler Burge’s claims about perceptual objectivity here (Burge 2010).
19 A different approach to understanding objectivity puts things in terms of the possibility of faultless
disagreement, rather than correctness conditions. For example, in his classic treatment, Crispin Wright
(1992) argues that one can make sense of minimal truth-aptness even for non-objective areas of discourse,
and that the question of objectivity (or realism) relates to whether more substantive conditions hold for
the area of discourse. I will continue to put things in terms of correctness conditions, but I believe that the
same points could be recast in these different terms. One could understand the potential mismatch between
thought and intuition that Kant highlights as corresponding to the idea that, in a case of objective thought,
disagreement absent cognitive shortcomings and errors could be explained by a difference in input.
20 Thank you to an anonymous referee for pressing this point.
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Belief or thought about correctness of beliefs or thoughts just does encompass the
possibility of discovering or thinking that a belief or thought is false, and hence requires
the conceptual capacity to think of the difference between the actual and the non-actual.
So, a distinction between actual and non-actual is required for objective thought.
With this in place, why do we (also) need to be able to make a conceptual distinction
between the possible and the actual? The remainder of this paper will be devoted to
an attempt to answer this question.
I offered one kind of answer to this question in Leech (2014). My proposal was
that this distinction is required to support our epistemic projects. Suppose we have
identified a class of thoughts that are not (yet) confirmed by experience. If we want to
gain more knowledge about the world, it would be helpful if we could isolate, from
amongst these, those thoughts that are at least possibly true. For then we can direct
our epistemic endeavours upon those cases, and not waste time on investigating the
impossible. The main problem with this proposal, given present purposes, is that it
provides an answer, if any, to the practical rather than the transcendental question. We
would most likely still get somewhere in our epistemic projects if we just sought out
confirmation of our non-actual thoughts; the impossible ones might simply slow us
down.
5 Another Kantian gap
We need to think again about the requirement underpinning objective thinking that
was supposed to have been met by the actual/non-actual distinction. This was the
connection between objectivity and idea that, in general, a state has correctness con-
ditions independent of the subject being in that the state, or something similar.21 The
importance of a distinction between the actual and the non-actual was a consequence
of the fact that those correctness conditions might be met or not independent of the
subject being in that state. Typically, this is taken to be the condition of objectivity, and
states are taken to be subjective otherwise (as is made explicit in the Gomes quotation
above). However, an important feature of Kant’s thinking on objectivity that is often
overlooked is that there are two very different ways in which a thought might fail to
be objective. It might be subjective, as in, its correctness conditions do depend on
the subject being in that state in some way (for example, whether the state is correct
depends on the existence of the state, or on the point of view of the subject of that
state). However, it might fail to have either of these kinds of correctness conditions
—those that depend on how things are with the world, and those that depend on how
things are with the subject or state. To put things the other way around, there are two
importantly different ways that a thinker’s being in a state does not make the content of
the state correct: because the correctness conditions depend upon the world; because
if the state has correctness conditions at all, they aren’t set by the world or by the
(subject being in that) state. Similarly, there are two different ways that something
21 Again, there are tricky cases, e.g. the thought that I am thinking. However, such cases may lend support
to the view developed here that we need more resources than these to have a proper conception of objectivity.
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might be independent of a subject’s point of view: it depends on how the world is; it
doesn’t depend either on how the world is, or on how the subject is.
In short, an objective thought depends for its correctness on how things are with
the world. A subjective thought depends for its correctness on how things are with
the representation itself and/or the perspective of the subject of the thought. But there
is nothing—thus far—that requires that a thought be either objective or subjective. It
might fail to have correctness conditions. Or it might have much thinner correctness
conditions, for example, mere logical conditions that concern a thought’s consistency,
but which do not go so far as to determine whether it gets the world (or the subject)
right or wrong. I prefer this latter. In Leech (2015) I argue that the laws of logic are
constitutive norms for thought, i.e., that a state must be evaluable in light of the laws
of logic if it is to count as a thought. If this is right, then all thoughts are subject to
some (logical) correctness conditions. But these are different to the further correctness
conditions that objective and subjective thoughts have as well. One might disagree
with this kind of view, but for present purposes the question of the exact status of
non-objective non-subjective thoughts can be left open. The main point is that there
is a third option.22
Bringing this back to the question at hand: it was proposed that we could understand
the function of an ability to make judgments about the actual and the non-actual
as a requirement of objective thought. But that was based on an understanding of
objectivity according to which the distinction between the objective and the subjective
is exhaustive. On this assumption, a conception of correctness conditions that are not
subjective—that is, that do not depend on (the thinker having) that thought—would
just be a conception of objective correctness conditions. However, if one follows
Kant in rejecting this assumption, and accepts that there are three options here, then
one needs to make a further distinction. If we want to be able to grasp the idea of
a thought with correctness conditions that don’t just not depend upon the thought,
but also depend upon the world, we need to distinguish this from the case where
a thought has neither of these kinds of correctness conditions. That is, amongst the
thoughts that do not depend upon the state—those which we can distinguish by using
the actual/non-actual distinction—we need to be able to distinguish those that have
correctness conditions that depend upon the world and those that do not. The proposal
is that it is the additional distinction between the impossible and the possible that
allows us to do this. Objective thoughts could be rendered correct by the world, even
if they are actually not.23 Non-objective, non-subjective thoughts could not be rendered
22 Again, the same point could be recast in terms of faultless disagreement. Even if we agree that objectivity
is a matter of there being no possibility of faultless disagreement, we might still recognise that there are
at least two very different ways that faultless disagreement might be possible: because the discourse is
after all tied to some kind of opinion or reaction that relates to the subject in an important way, such as
finding something funny or delicious; or because the discourse has no further correctness conditions beyond
the standards of assertibility that are required for the discourse to be minimally truth-apt (putting matters
in Wright’s terms), and those standards of assertibility are suitably thin to seem different to canonical
subjective matters, for example, statements ought to be non-contradictory, but appear to have no relation at
all to a subject’s perspective or opinion.
23 This may appear to smuggle in the kind of realism about modality that I specified earlier should be left
open. However, whilst the conception of possibility at work here is one that concerns a possible relation
between a thought and the world, it does not build in a particular view about which thoughts are possible
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correct by the world because they do not even go so far as to be about the world. They
only have thin, logical standards of correctness, if any.
Take, for example, my thought of a pink frog on my desk. Not only is it non-actual,
it is possible. A pink frog could have been on my desk, but one is not. But this means
that it makes sense to think of it as false of the world, as failing to live up to its
correctness conditions. This would be different to my thought (examples are difficult,
so let’s go with Kant) that I had a conversation with God yesterday. Such a thought
just isn’t the right kind of thing to be confirmed by experience, and so doesn’t have
the right kind of correctness conditions to be objective.24
We thus need to revise the conception of objectivity canvassed above. Objectivity
is not just a matter of having non-subjective correctness conditions, but also of being
possible. A thought is thus objective, then, only if we take it to have objective correct-
ness conditions, and if it is possible. Possibility is implicated in a proper conception
of objective correctness conditions, hence, this requires us to also have a concept of
possibility.
To sum up, the “Kantian gap” approach puts forth the idea that an ability to make
modal judgments using modal concepts such as possible and its cognates has an
ineliminable role to play in the possibility of objective thought. The proposal rests
on several key assumptions: that creatures with minds like ours have two separate
capacities for direct presentation of objects (intuitions) and for conceptual thinking;
that there are two ways for a thought to fail to be objective; that the objectivity of a
representation requires that the subject having the representation have some conception
of objectivity; that modal concepts are implicated in this conception of objectivity (for
reasons connected to the second assumption). These together, I have argued, combine
to form a case for the importance of a distinction between the possible and the actual as
underpinning our status as objective thinkers. Hence, the proposal promises to answer
the transcendental question.
To return briefly to Kant: in the sections of the Critique of Judgment that have
inspired this line of thought, Kant contrasts our kind of cognitive capacities—involv-
ing two distinct capacities for intuition and for thought—with those of an ‘intuitive
understanding’, who has one single capacity for both intuition and thought. Kant argues
that creatures like us, with that split cognitive architecture, require modal concepts,
but that the intuitive understanding would not.
Footnote 23 continued
or not, and what kind of account of that possibility we should give. More detail on this conception of
possibility—beyond reasons to take it to be metaphysical—is a task for another time.
24 If objectivity and possibility are thereby closely tied, one might wonder about interactions with negation.
For, in the case of necessities and impossibilities, it would seem that one could transform an objective to a
non-objective thought, and vice versa, with the mere addition of negation. This would be bizarre indeed, if
objectivity corresponded to meaningfulness. For it would be absurd to claim that, for example, whilst 2 +
24 is necessarily true and objective, it is not the case that 2+24 is suddenly meaningless. It would be
even more absurd to claim that whilst 2+25 were impossible and meaningless, as if by magic, it is not the
case that 2+25 is meaningful (and, indeed, necessarily true). But this is not the intended view. It is more
plausible that, if a thought isn’t the kind of thought that could make a claim that is right or wrong depending
on how the world is, then the world couldn’t be that way, for if it could, then the world’s being that way
would presumably be the correctness conditions for the thought. But if the world therefore isn’t that way,
it can surely be possible to have the objective thought that it isn’t. Thank you to an audience member at the
University of Stirling for raising this question.
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I cannot presuppose that in every [cognitive] being thinking and intuiting, hence
the possibility and actuality of things, are two different conditions for the exercise
of its cognitive faculties. For an understanding to which this distinction did not
apply, all objects that I cognize would be (exist), and the possibility of some that
did not exist, i.e. their contingency if they did exist, as well as the necessity that
is to be distinguished from that, would not enter into the representation of such
a being at all. (Kant 2000: 273; CJ 5: 402–3)
Details of this argument aside, our present question is: if the above argument is suc-
cessful, that the ability to make a distinction between the possible and the actual is
a condition of objective representation, then is Kant committed to the view that the
intuitive understanding is incapable of objective representation?25 Given that the intu-
itive understanding is supposed to be ‘divine’, and so potentially a way to think of
what God’s mind might be like, surely the conclusion that God can’t represent the
world is unacceptable. Luckily, Kant is not so committed. It is important to remem-
ber that the argument is intended to apply to ‘creatures like us’, that is, thinkers that
have the potential to be mistaken. In particular, for Kant, we can be mistaken because
objective thought requires the cooperation of two capacities that have the potential to
come apart. In the case of the intuitive understanding, there is no potential for error,
for to think of something is at the same time to intuit it, so there is no possibility of
thought without a corresponding object. The conditions of objective representation
for the intuitive understanding will be very different.
6 The metaphysical modality question
There remains the question of whether this proposal can answer the metaphysical
modality question. What is the content of the modal concepts that would play the
role outlined above? And what would it take for that to count as metaphysical? The
possibility in question concerns the possibility of being given an object, but not much
more than that, that is, it does not include constraints connected to the laws of nature,
or the behaviour of actual kinds, but rather the most general conditions of thoughts
being able to be presented with corresponding objects. Metaphysical modality is often
characterised as absolute, where this means that if something is absolutely neces-
sary, then there is no (alethic, non-epistemic) sense of possibility according to which
it might have been otherwise, and that if something is absolutely possible, if it is
possible in any (alethic, non-epistemic) sense, it is possible in this sense.26 How-
ever, logical modality might also seem to be absolute in this sense. But metaphysical
modality is intended to be distinct from logical modality. Loosely speaking, meta-
physical modality has something extra to do with being. Gideon Rosen puts this in
terms of metaphysical modality being a real modality. Combining these thoughts, we
should expect metaphysical modality to be the most absolute of the real modalities, the
modalities concerned with being. Indeed, this is essentially Rosen’s characterisation.
25 Thank you to an anonymous referee for raising this question.
26 See, for example, Hale (1996).
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If P is metaphysically necessary, it is necessary in every real sense: If P is really
possible in any sense, then it’s possible in the metaphysical sense. (Rosen 2006,
p. 16)
With this in mind, I would suggest that the modality implicated by the “Kantian gap”
argument deserves the title of “metaphysical modality”, because it concerns the most
general conditions under which an object could be given.
One consequence of drawing this connection between the modal concepts impli-
cated in objective thought above and the notion of metaphysical modality, is that it
might seem to rule out the possibility of objective thought about impossibilities. One
might take this to raise a significant problem for the accommodation of a posteriori
metaphysical necessities.27 If it really is a posteriori, for example, that Socrates is
human, or that water is H2O, then it had better not be unthinkable that Socrates is not
human (e.g., that Socrates is a robot), or that water is not H2O (e.g., that water is an
element). However, it is important to remember that, on the proposed view, there are
non-objective (non-subjective) thoughts. It is not unthinkable that Socrates is a robot,
or that water is an element, even of it is not possible to think these objectively. And
it may well take significant empirical work to discover that a thought that seemed to
be objective is, after all, not, because it is impossible, just as it may take significant
empirical work to discover that a thought is necessary, or impossible. As long as the
impossibilities are meaningful and thinkable, as is allowed, then we can’t take a short
cut from unthinkability to impossibility.
In conclusion, there are several different questions we might be asking when we
ask: ‘what is the function of modal judgment?’. Some particularly interesting ques-
tions concern the transcendental role of modal judgment, and the transcendental role
of peculiarly metaphysical modal judgment. I have argued that the “Kantian gap”
approach promises direct answers to the transcendental metaphysical modality ques-
tion. But, it turns out, that promise depends on not one, but two, Kantian gaps. The
first is the potential mismatch between concepts and thoughts, on the one hand, and
intuitions, on the other. The second is a gap that Kant saw between objective and
subjective representations. The proposal is, then, that in order for objective thought to
be possible in the light of these two gaps, thinkers require an ability to conceptually
distinguish between the possible and the actual, and hence require an ability to apply
modal concepts, and make modal judgments. If I am right that there is good reason to
call the kind of modality implicated in these concepts “metaphysical”, then we also
have a potential answer to the transcendental metaphysical modality question.28
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
27 As an anonymous referee did.
28 Many thanks go to audiences in Frankfurt and Stirling for helpful responses to the paper, as well as
to John Divers and Bill Brewer for discussion of some of the philosophical issues. Thank you also to two
anonymous referees for this journal, who offered insightful and constructive comments.
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